EXHIBIT 25

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Civil Aviation Security Information Circular

Information of Concern to Aviation Security Personnel
Current Security Procedures Should be Reviewed in Light of
This Information

Subject: Prospects for a Terrorist Hijacking

Number: IC-2000-01 Date: April 27, 2000

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EXPIRATION: Indefinite

The purpose of this information Circular is to provide U.S. air carriers and Part 107 airports with FAA's assessment for the potential for a terrorist hijacking.

INFORMATION: On December 24, 1999, five terrorists armed with pistols, grenades, and knives hijacked Indian Airlines flight 814 while en route to New Delhi, India, from Kathmandu, Nepal. The Airbus A-300 with 189 passengers and crew was diverted to Amritstar, India; then Lahore, Pakistan; then to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, before arriving in Qandahar, Afghanistan, on December 26. During the flight from Nepal to India, one passenger was killed by the terrorists. On December 31 the incident was resolved peacefully after the hijackers negotiated the release of three incarcerated extremists and their own escape in return for the release of the hostages.

<u>Comment:</u> Most international hijackings in the 1990s were attributed to individuals motivated by personal factors like escaping social, political or economic conditions in their homeland. They were largely unprofessional and rarely involved violence against passengers or crew. Conditions for a terrorist seizure of an airliner were not as favorable as in the previous two decades. Arrests of key group members, disruption of cells, struggles within groups, restraints placed by terrorist state sponsors and the lack of terrorist safe haven airports may all have contributed to making this option less desirable.

In light of the successful hijacking of indian Airlines 814, we believe that the situation has changed. We assess that the prospect for terrorist hijackings has

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increased and that U.S. airliners could be targeted in an attempt to obtain the release of indicted or convicted terrorists imprisoned in the United States.

Afghanistan may become a new terrorist safe haven for hijacked aircraft due to Usama bin Laden's influence there. The use of a safe haven is important for a sustained terrorist hijacking to be successful because the plane can be held in a controlled environment. The hijacking of Indian Airlines 814 appears to have been well rehearsed, and the ability of the terrorists to hold the aircraft in Afghanistan contributed to its success.

We assess that the terrorist hijacking of a U.S. airliner is more probable outside the United States due to access to safe havens. Although a hijacking within the U.S. would likely result in a larger number of American hostages, it would be operationally more difficult to accomplish. We do not rule it out, but at least two logistical factors would make it more difficult. First, the terrorist support structure In the U.S. is less developed than overseas, and second, if an aircraft were hijacked with the objective of flying it to a safe haven, it would need to be refueled.

DISSEMINATION GUIDANCE:

- (1) This IC shall be disseminated to all U.S. air carriers. It is intended for the information of carrier corporate security directors, senior management personnel, ground security coordinators, and supervisory security personnel at overseas locations.
- (2) This IC may also be disseminated to managers and security elements at Part 107 airports. Such dissemination must include the dissemination guidance contained in this IC.
- (3) If required in the course of aviation duties, U.S. air carrier local stations security personnel outside the U.S. may coordinate the information in this circular with local airport management and law enforcement personnel on a strict need-to-know basis only.
- (4) All recipients must limit dissemination within their respective organizations to personnel who have an operational need-to-know.

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FOR DEPARTMENT OF STATE: Retransmittal to appropriate foreign posts is authorized. Posts must refer to STATE 093752, 300308Z Mar 93, Subject: FAA Security Directives and Information Circulars: Definitions and Handling, for specific guidance on handling and dissemination.

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